Some parallel duties and remedies in equity and corporations law

Paper delivered to the New South Wales Bar Association Sydney CPD Conference 25 March 2017

Justice Ashley Black
A Judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Introduction

I will address several areas of overlap between duties and remedies in equity and the corporations law. The areas I will cover have some connection in principle, but I have largely chosen them to reflect areas of interest, from the possibly idiosyncratic perspective of practice in the two jurisdictions. I will deal first with some issues and recent case law in directors’ duties in equity and by statute; then with an overlap between claims for breach of directors’ duties, derivative actions and oppression claims; then with compensation and applications for interlocutory injunctions in equity and under the Corporations Act; and lastly with open issues in accessorrial liability in equity and under the Corporations Act. I will focus on several recent cases in doing so.

Directors’ breach of fiduciary duty at general law and statutory duties

General law duties

The relationship between a director and company is, of course, a traditional, status-based, fiduciary relationship.\(^1\)

Turning first to the position in equity, the High Court has, of course, emphasised that Australian courts only recognise fiduciary duties of proscriptive or prohibitive character, imposing the obligation on the fiduciary not to obtain an unauthorised profit or to be in a position of conflict, and the existence of a fiduciary relationship does not impose a positive legal duty on the fiduciary to act in the beneficiary’s interests.\(^2\)

A different result may still be open in the corporations law. In the appeal in Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No 3) [2012] WASCA 157; (2012) 44 WAR 1, the majority in the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia held that the director’s duties to act in good faith and in the company’s interests and for proper purposes, although imposing positive obligations, can nonetheless be characterised as fiduciary, as long as they are not too ‘proscriptive’.

---


and Carr AJA took substantially the same view.\(^3\) This question was subsequently noted in *Netglory Pty Ltd v Caratti* [2013] WASC 364 at [345]ff, where Edelman J observed that it may be incorrect, on the current state of Australian authorities, to characterise a breach of positive duties by a director, such as duties to act in good faith and in the company’s interests and for proper purposes, as a breach of fiduciary duty. His Honour nonetheless noted (at [348]-[349]) that the High Court “appears to have recognised that there may be a fiduciary prescriptive liability to account, where that liability is associated with a prescriptive fiduciary duty”\(^4\), that it may be possible to describe the “proper purposes” duty in negative terms, as a duty not to act for collateral purposes; and that the duty or duties to act in good faith in the interests of the company could alternatively be characterised as prescriptive conditions upon the exercise of a fiduciary power.

The emphasis on the prescriptive character of fiduciary duties in Australian law means that Australian courts have not been prepared to recognise an affirmative duty of disclosure applying to directors or company officers as a separate fiduciary duty or an incident of the no conflict rule. A director’s non-disclosure of information relevant to the company, or indeed of his or her own breach of duty, is therefore generally not a separate breach of duty.\(^5\) The fact of disclosure may, of course, still be relevant to informed consent to or ratification of conduct that would otherwise be a breach of fiduciary duty.

English law has taken a different approach, treating a fiduciary’s non-disclosure of a breach of duty as itself a potential breach of fiduciary duty.\(^6\)

*Issues as to the scope of the no conflict and no profit rules*

The no conflict and no profit rules are of course well-recognised incidents of a fiduciary position. There is one significant limitation to the no conflict rule. In equity, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest only arises in that part of a relationship between a fiduciary and his or her beneficiary that is fiduciary in character.\(^7\) That proposition also applies to the scope of a director’s duties. In *Howard v Federal Commissioner of Taxation* [2014] HCA 83; (2014) 253 CLR 11, a company director contended that he was not liable for a tax on a judgment in his favour because he had received the amount of the judgment as constructive trustee for a company of which he was a director. The High

---

\(^3\) At [918]-[933] per Lee AJA, at [1956] and [1978] per Drummond AJA. Carr AJA also observed (at [2733]) that he was not prepared to hold, on the present state of authority, that duties to act in the company’s interests were not fiduciary duties.

\(^4\) Referring to *Bolinger v Kingsway Group Ltd* [2009] HCA 44; (2009) 239 CLR 269 at 290.


\(^6\) *Item Software (UK) Ltd v Fassihi* [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1244; *Hanco ATM Systems Ltd v Cashbox ATM Systems Ltd* [2007] EWHC 1599 (Ch) at [65]; *GLML Trading Ltd v Maroo* [2012] 2 BCLC 369 at [192]–[195]; *McTear v Engelhard* [2014] EWHC 1056 (Ch) at [10]–[91].

\(^7\) *Birtchnell v Equity Trustees Executors and Agency Co Ltd* (1929) 42 CLR 384 at 408 per Dixon J; *New Zealand Netherlands Society ‘Oranje’ Inc v Kuys* [1973] 1 WLR 1126 at 1130 per Lord Wilberforce.
Court rejected that proposition, on that basis that the director had not obtained any gain or benefit by use of his position as a director, there was no conflict and no substantial possibility of conflict between his personal interest and his duty to the company and therefore no basis for a constructive trust. French CJ and Keane J noted (at [34]) that the limits of fiduciary duties were to be determined by the character of the relationship, the parties’ express agreement and their course of dealings and that:

"[t]he scope of the fiduciary duty generally in relation to conflicts of interest must accommodate itself to the particulars of the underlying relationship which give rise to the duty so that it is consistent with and conforms to the scope and limits of that relationship."

The scope of the no conflict and no profit rules has been considered in recent cases concerning directors. In *Coope v LCM Litigation Fund Pty Ltd* [2016] NSWCA 37; (2016) 333 ALR 524, Payne JA (with whom Gleece and Leeming JJA agreed) summarised the no conflict and no profit rule as follows (at [105]):

“A fiduciary is under an obligation, without informed consent, not to promote the personal interests of the fiduciary by making or pursuing a gain in circumstances in which there is a conflict, or a real or substantial possibility of a conflict, between the personal interest of the fiduciary and those to whom the duty is owed … A conflict arises if there is a real and sensible possibility that the personal interests of the fiduciary divide the loyalty of the fiduciary with the result that he or she could not properly discharge their duties to the beneficiary. …”

The Court there accepted that there was no positive obligation of disclosure upon a senior executive who was negotiating separation arrangements with the company, with the intention of joining a significant competitor, but that disclosure was the only defence to a breach of his fiduciary duty in those circumstances. The Court there found that the extent of information disclosed by that senior executive was not sufficient to comply with his disclosure obligations in order to achieve informed consent.

The application of the no conflict and no profit rules in a particular case can raise difficult questions of judgment, which would make it more difficult to predict the outcome of litigation. This difficulty was recognised in *Australian Careers Institute Pty Ltd v Australian Institute of Fitness Pty Ltd* [2016] NSWCA 347; (2016) 116 ACSR 566, where Bathurst CJ (at [4]; Sackville AJA to similar effect at [133]) referred to the High Court’s decisions in *Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in liq)* above and *Howard v Federal Commissioner of Taxation* above and observed that:

“[D]ifferent minds may reach different conclusions as to the presence or absence of a real possibility of conflict between duty and interest or duty and duty and the doctrine cannot be inexorably applied without regard to the particular circumstances of the relationship."

The Court there upheld a finding at first instance that actions by a director in setting out a rival business could adversely affect a company in the conduct of
its business, and that conduct had placed the director in a position where his duty to the company conflicted with his interests in establishing and promoting the new business.

The no conflict rule has a strict application in the sense that, if a transaction has occurred in conflict of interest, a fiduciary (including a company director) cannot avoid a breach of that rule by asserting the fairness of the transaction or that it was in the company’s best interests or that the director was not acting with subjective dishonesty. However, there are differing views as to whether the duty is breached by the existence of a position of conflict, or only by the pursuit of a director’s personal interest while he or she is in a position of conflict. There will often be little practical difference between the two approaches. In the cases where the wider view has been expressed, the director has generally acted in a position of conflict in any event.

The statutory directors’ duties

Section 180 of the Corporations Act deals with a director’s duty of care and diligence. The cases indicate that a contravention of that section generally requires that an act or omission involve a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to the company’s interests, and that risk of harm must be balanced against the potential benefits that could reasonably be expected to accrue to the company from that conduct. The case law also generally supports the view that this section cannot be used to impose liability on a director merely because the company has contravened another provision of the Corporations Act, but that section may be breached by a director’s conduct in authorising conduct that risks exposing the company to civil penalties or another liability under the Corporations Act, at least if that risk is clear and countervailing potential benefits are insignificant.

---

The scope of this section was recently considered, at some length, in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Cassimatis (No 8) [2016] FCA 1023; (2016) 336 ALR 209. Edelman J there held that two directors of Storm Financial Ltd (“Storm”), Mr and Mrs Cassimatis, had contravened that section in exercising their powers as directors of Storm in a manner that caused or permitted (by omission) inappropriate advice to be given by that entity to a particular class of investors who were, inter alia, retired or close to retirement and had little or no prospect of rebuilding their financial position if they suffered substantial loss. His Honour rejected (at [498]ff) a submission that a contravention of that section could not be established by conduct in breach of the Corporations Act where directors and shareholders were the same persons, and shareholders had authorised the conduct. His Honour also recognised (at [774]), in a finding that is logical but possibly somewhat disconcerting, that the fact that relevant investors suffered significant losses was neither necessary nor sufficient for a breach of s 180 of the Corporations Act. That leaves open a question, which may be relevant at the penalty stage, whether the fact of such losses is relevant to the penalty that should be imposed for the relevant contravention.

Section 181 of the Corporations Act requires a director or officer of a corporation to exercise his or her powers and discharge his or her duties in good faith in the best interests of the corporation and for a proper purpose. That section overlaps with the director’s general law duties to act for proper purposes and in good faith and in the company’s interests. The bulk of authority indicates that this section requires a director to act in what he or she honestly believes to be the best interests of the company, and that the substantial purpose for which they discharge their duties must be a proper one, a matter which is determined on an objective approach. The scope of this section was recently considered by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Duncan v Independent Commission Against Corruption [2016] NSWCA 143, where the Court held that it was open to the Independent Commission Against Corruption to find that the directors had not discharged an obligation to avoid a conflict of interest, in connection with the sale of a flawed asset to a company which would generate a profit for the directors, by withdrawing from the decision-making process as to the transaction without disclosing the true position.

Section 182 of the Corporations Act prohibits a director, secretary, officer or employee of a corporation from improperly using his or her position to gain an advantage for himself or herself or someone else or cause detriment to the corporation, and that section reflects the fiduciary obligation of a director under the general law. Section 183 of the Corporations Act in turn prohibits a director or officer or employee of a corporation from improperly using information to gain an advantage for themselves or someone else or cause

---

12 Westpac Banking Corporation v Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No 3) above per Lee AJA and Drummond AJA, although Carr AJA treated that question as primarily subjective; Re Colorado Products Pty Ltd (in prov liq) above at [421]; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Drake (No 2) [2016] FCA 1552 at [494]; Hart Security Australia Pty Ltd v Boucousis [2016] NSWCA 307; (2016) 339 ALR 659 at [75] (per Meagher JA, with whom Bathurst CJ and Beazley P agreed).
detriment to the corporation. These sections are regularly found to have been breached by conduct that, for example, diverts business from a company to another entity or involves misuse of confidential information.\textsuperscript{13}

**Narrowing of scope of statutory directors’ duties**

In equity, the person to whom a fiduciary duty is owed can narrow the scope of that duty or ratify a breach of that duty, and a company's constitution or shareholders in general meeting can similarly narrow the scope of a director's duty, although not so as to bind a company to a transaction that constitutes a fraud on its creditors.\textsuperscript{14} A director's statutory duties are less readily excluded or narrowed by shareholders than general law duties. In *Angas Law Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Carabelas* [2005] HCA 23; (2005) 226 CLR 507 at [32], Gleeson CJ and Heydon J noted that shareholders could not release directors from the statutory duties imposed by a predecessor to s 182 of the *Corporations Act*, although their acquiescence in a course of conduct might affect the practical content of those duties and be relevant to whether the element of impropriety necessary to a breach of the section was established.\textsuperscript{15}

**Overlap between claims for breach of directors’ duties, oppression claims and derivative actions under ss 236-236 of the *Corporations Act***

Section 232 of the *Corporations Act* provides that the Court may make an order under s 233 of the Act if the conduct of a company's affairs, or an actual or proposed act or omission by or on behalf of a company, or a resolution, or a proposed resolution, of members or a class of members of a company is either contrary to the interests of the members as a whole or oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly discriminatory against a member or members whether in that capacity or in another capacity. Section 233 of the Act in turn specifies a series of remedies that may be available in an oppression case, a number of which involve orders against the company, including, for example, an order that the company be wound up, that its existing constitution be modified or repealed, or regulating the conduct of the company's affairs in the future.

Conduct that amounts to a breach of directors’ duties, such as the diversion of assets or opportunities from a company to other entities, may also establish

\textsuperscript{13} For a small selection of the cases, see *Landmark Underwriting Agency Pty Ltd v Kilborn* [2006] NSWSC 1108 at [71]; *Colorado Products* above at [432]–[433]; *Investa Properties Pty Ltd v Nankervis (No 7)* [2015] FCA 1004; (2015) 109 ACSR 465 (claim against a senior employee); *Prestige Lifting Services Pty Ltd v Williams* [2015] FCA 1063; (2015) 333 ALR 674 (former executive director and former employee of a company breached fiduciary and contractual duties and these sections by diverting projects away from the company to a new entity in competition with the company and by misuse of confidential information); *SBA Music Pty Ltd v Hall (No 3)* [2015] FCA 1079 at [28], [31]–[35] (independent contractor who performed the most senior management role within a company contravened the sections in taking up business opportunities of the company for his own benefit).

\textsuperscript{14} *Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liq) v Nazir* [2015] UKSC 23; [2016] AC 1; *BCI Finances Pty Ltd (in liq) v Binetter (No 4)* [2016] FCA 1351 at [278], [284].

\textsuperscript{15} For commentary, see I Devendra, “Statutory directors’ duties, the civil penalty regime and shareholder ratification: What role does the public interest play?” (2014) 32 C&SLJ 399.
oppression.\(^{16}\) The majority of the cases indicate that the court can make an order for an account of profits or compensation in favour of the company, but not an individual shareholder, in an oppression action, although that claim could otherwise only be brought by the company or as a derivative action with leave of the court.\(^{17}\) There remains an open question whether the court, in oppression proceedings concerning a corporate trustee, has power to make orders in respect of the trust.\(^{18}\)

Applications are often brought, with mixed success, for leave to bring statutory derivative actions under s 237 of the Corporations Act, or in the court’s inherent jurisdiction which is applicable where a company is in liquidation or, possibly, other forms of insolvency administration. The relevant considerations for grant of leave to bring a derivative claim are specified in s 237(2) of the Corporations Act, which requires the Court to grant leave if satisfied of five matters, including that the applicant is acting in good faith; that the grant of leave is in the best interests of the company; and that there is a serious question to be tried. Matters relevant to whether the applicant is acting in good faith include the applicant's honest belief that a good cause of action exists and has reasonable prospects of success (although that belief will be tested against whether a reasonable person in the circumstances would hold that belief) and whether the applicant is seeking to bring the action for a collateral purpose.\(^{19}\) The case law indicates that the requirement that the grant of leave is in the best interests of the company is a relatively demanding one and the Court must be satisfied that the proposed action actually is, on the balance of probabilities, in the company’s best interest, with relevant matters including the prospects of success of the proceedings, their likely costs, the likely recovery if the proceedings are successful and the likely costs, the likely recovery if the proceedings are successful and the likely recovery if the proceedings are successful and the likely


\(^{18}\) The view that the court has such a power was accepted in Wain v Drapac [2012] VSC 156 and in Arhangelschi v Ussher [2013] VSC 253; [2013] 94 ACSR 86; to the contrary Kizquari, Trust Company Limited v Noosa Venture 1 Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1334; (2010) 80 ACSR 485; and see B Heape, “Oppression proceedings and trust remedies: what are the limits?” (2013) 31 C&SLJ 325.

consequences if they are not. A party seeking such leave is typically required to indemnify the company against costs, charges and expenses of and incidental to bringing and continuing the derivative claims for which leave is granted. Sections 236–237 do not apply to a company that is in liquidation but leave to bring derivative actions can be granted in the Court’s inherent jurisdiction in that case.

Orders for compensation and account of profits in equity and under ss 1317H and 1317HA of the Corporations Act

Equitable compensation is now readily available for breach of an equitable duty, including breach of fiduciary duty, and also for equitable non-fiduciary duties such as the equitable duty of care and skill applicable to directors. In Nicholls v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd [2012] NSWCA 383, in a case alleging breach of fiduciary duty by employees of and consultants to a law firm, Sackville AJA (with whom Meagher and Barrett JJA agreed) summarised the principles underlying equitable compensation as follows:

“Equitable compensation has three principal features … First, the primary purpose of the remedy is compensation for what has been lost. Thus, compensation is ordinarily computed by reference to the detriment suffered by the plaintiff … Secondly, the assessment of equitable compensation is not fettered by common law principles, such as remoteness of damage or foreseeability, which can diminish the quantum of damages at common law. The justification for the difference in approach is that the obligation to make restitution which courts of equity have imposed on defaulting trustees and fiduciaries is of a more absolute nature than the common law obligation to pay damages for tort or breach of contract … Thirdly, although the equitable duties imposed on a fiduciary have an element of deterrence …, as a general proposition there is no element of penalty in the assessment of compensation … [citations omitted]"

There are still significant open issues as to the approach to causation in assessing compensation for breach of trust and, perhaps less controversially, for breach of fiduciary duty. In Swindle v Harrison [1997] 4 All ER 705, at 733–734, Mummery LJ observed that there “is no equitable by-pass of the need to establish causation” and a unanimous High Court approved that observation in Youyang Pty Ltd v Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher [2003] HCA 15; (2003) 212 CLR 484 at [44]. The most expansive approach to causation applies to a trustee who misapplies trust property, who can be required to restore the trust property or, if that is not possible, pay an equivalent monetary

---

20 Swansson v Pratt above; Maher v Honeysett and Maher Electrical Contractors Pty Ltd above at [44].
amount into the trust, and that liability is not limited by considerations of causation or remoteness.\textsuperscript{24}

That approach can also be applied where a director misapplies company property in breach of fiduciary duty. In \textit{O’Halloran v RT Thomas & Family Pty Ltd} (1998) 45 NSWLR 262 at 272, Spigelman CJ noted (at 274–275) that:

“[A] claim for equitable compensation for breach of a fiduciary obligation requires a causal link between the breach and loss. Causation in equity is not, however, susceptible to the formulation of a single test. It is necessary to identify the purpose of the particular rule to determine the appropriate approach to issues of causation.”

The Chief Justice also noted that the question of causation for breach of a director’s fiduciary duty at general law was not determined by the causation principles applicable in respect of his breach of statutory obligation.

In \textit{Nicholls v Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd} above, Sackville AJA (with whom Meagher and Barrett JJA agreed) observed at [172] that:

“It is common ground that a claim for equitable compensation requires a causal link between the breach and the loss …. Thus to claim equitable compensation for the appellants’ breaches of fiduciary duty, [the respondent] must establish that it has sustained losses and that there is a causal link between the losses claimed and the breaches.”

His Honour summarised the principles arising from \textit{O’Halloran v RT Thomas & Family Pty Ltd} above (at [174], omitting citations) as follows:

- Analysis of causation depends on the rule being applied. Thus, the “common sense” answer to a question of causation will differ according to the purpose for which the question is asked. In order to answer such a question, it is necessary to identify the purpose and scope of the relevant rule ….

- Questions of causation of loss said to arise from breaches of fiduciary obligations are to be determined in a different way from questions of causation arising from breaches of common law obligations …

- The object of equitable compensation is to restore persons who have suffered loss to the position in which they would have been if there had been no breach of the equitable obligation. Unlike damages at common law, however, the loss as a consequence of the breach is to be assessed with the full benefit of hindsight …

Where equitable compensation is sought for breaches of fiduciary duty, it is necessary to identify criteria which supply an adequate or sufficient connection between the equitable compensation claimed and the breaches of duty … [See also Beach Petroleum v Kennedy, at [429]–[430], pointing out that there is a normative aspect to the determination of issues of causation.]

In the case of a trustee dealing with trust property in breach of a trust, a sufficient connection will be established irrespective of the identification of a separate and concurrent cause when the loss would not have occurred if there had been no breach of duty. The policy underlying this strict principle applies equally to a breach of fiduciary duty by a director of a company, since equity is concerned not only to compensate the plaintiff, but to enforce the duty of the director … Thus the approach to causation which has been adopted for the trustee of a traditional trust should be applied to fraudulent dispositions of company property in breach of fiduciary duty …”

Generally speaking, the case law does not permit an inquiry into the relative importance of contributory causes in determining compensation for a breach of a director’s fiduciary duty, and the principles of causation applicable to breach of duty by a trustee of a traditional trust may be applied, given the vulnerability of a company which places its property in the power of directors.25 The court will apply the benefit of hindsight and ordinarily determine the amount of compensation at the date of trial.26

Some English academic literature has sought to explain the different approaches to causation by distinguishing between substitutive and reparative compensation. Substitutive equitable compensation relates to a claim for the substituted value of an asset dissipated by a trustee or custodian without authority, by analogy with the common account, where a trustee is required to account for how it has dealt with trust assets without need for any allegation of wrongdoing. A claim that a director had misapplied company property would be treated as a claim for substitutive compensation. Reparative equitable compensation involves a claim for reparation for loss suffered by breach of duty, for example for a loss suffered by a breach of a duty of loyalty or director’s fiduciary duties, and extends only to the loss caused by the breach.27 That approach has been taken up by Edelman J in decisions in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, but its wider future is still open.28

26 Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1993) 13 WAR 11; 11 ACSR 785 at 851-852; Permanent Building Society (in liq) v Wheeler (1994) 11 WAR 187 at 235; 14 ACSR 109; 12 ACLC 674; Southern Real Estate Pty Ltd v Dellow above at [52]; Hydrocool Pty Ltd v Hepburn (No 4) above.
The jurisdiction to award equitable compensation or an account of profits for breach of fiduciary duty overlaps with the statutory power to award compensation for breach of some, but not all, of the obligations imposed under the *Corporations Act*. That power extends only to breaches of those sections that are designated as a civil penalty provision or a financial civil penalty provision under the *Corporations Act*.

Section 1317H(1) of the *Corporations Act* provides that a Court may order a person to compensate a corporation or registered scheme (but not a shareholder, unitholder or third party) for damage suffered by the corporation or scheme if that person has contravened a corporation/scheme civil penalty provision (as defined) in relation to the corporation or scheme and the damage resulted from the contravention. Section 1317HA(1) is wider, providing for recovery of compensation by a person who has suffered loss as a result of a contravention of a financial services civil penalty provision. The case law indicates that the words “resulted from” in these sections refer to damage which, as a matter of fact, was caused by the contravention and that they should be given their ordinary meaning of requiring a causal connection between the damage and the contravening conduct and do not import equitable principles of causation applicable to fiduciaries.

Compensation under these sections is assessed by reference to the loss at the date the order is made rather than as at the date of the contravention, which broadly reflects the approach in equity rather than in contractual damages. Common law principles relating to the duty to mitigate are also not directly applicable to actions for compensation under ss 1317H and 1317HA, although a defendant may seek to show that a claimant’s unreasonable conduct resulted in its losses, and has the onus of establishing the loss arising from such conduct. In the recent decision in *BCI Finances Pty Ltd (in liq) v Binetter (No 4)* [2016] FCA 1351, Gleeson J followed the...
decisions of the United Kingdom House of Lords and Supreme Court in holding that a company may suffer loss, which can be recovered against its directors, when it is exposed to large liabilities that it has no capacity to meet, although it is a “$2 company” and never had a capacity to meet those liabilities. That approach is of real advantage to a company’s creditors, if they are exposed by transactions in breach of duty to liabilities which the company has no capacity to meet.

The statutory provisions also permit, in effect, recovery of loss in the manner of an account of profits in equity. Sections 1317H(2) and 1317HA(2) provide that, in determining the damage suffered for the purposes of making a compensation order, profits made by any person resulting from that contravention or the offence are included. The effect of those subsections is to allow the court to order compensation including profits made by a wrongdoer, even if there is no corresponding loss on the claimant’s part.

**Injunctions in equity and under s 1324 of the Corporations Act**

In determining whether to grant an interlocutory injunction in its equitable jurisdiction, the Court will apply the principles set out in *Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill* [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57, where Gummow and Hayne JJ noted (at [65]) that that determination involved inquiries as to (1) whether the plaintiff had made out a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the preservation of the status quo pending the trial; and (2) whether the inconvenience or injury that the plaintiff would likely suffer if an injunction was refused outweighed the injury that the defendant would suffer if an injunction were granted. The questions whether the applicant has a seriously arguable case and the balance of convenience are interrelated, since the greater the extent to which the balance of convenience favours one course over another, the less strong a case for final relief might be required to justify an injunction and, conversely, the stronger the case for final relief, the less may be required to tip the balance of convenience in the applicant’s favour. In determining whether to grant a final injunction, the court will of course have regard to whether damages are an adequate remedy and any discretionary considerations.

Similar but not identical issues arise in respect of the Court’s power to order interim or final injunctive relief under s 1324(1) of the Corporations Act. That section allows an order in the nature of injunctive relief where a person has engaged in, is engaging in or is proposing to engage in conduct that constituted, constitutes or would constitute, inter alia, a contravention of the Corporations Act, and such an order may also be made against a person who is “knowingly concerned” in or party to that contravention. The case law has...

---


34 Ho v Akai Pty Ltd (in liq) above; Grimaldi v Chameleon Mining NL (No 2) [2012] FCAFC 6; (2012) 200 FCR 296; 287 ALR 22 at [630]-[631]; Lifeplan Australia Friendly Society Ltd v Woff [2016] FCA 248; (2016) 259 IR 384 at [424].

35 V-Flow Pty Ltd v Holyoake Industries (Vic) Pty Ltd [2013] FCAFC 16; (2013) 296 ALR 418; (2013) 93 ACSR 76 at [54].

36 Referring to *Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd* (1968) 118 CLR 618.
emphasised that the Court is exercising a statutory jurisdiction rather than equitable jurisdiction under this section and that different considerations can apply.\textsuperscript{37}

Section 1324(4) authorises the Court to grant an interim injunction where, in its opinion, it is desirable to do so, pending determination of an application or a final injunction under s 1324(1). There are potential differences of approach in an application for an interlocutory injunction in equity and an interim injunction under s 1324(4) of the Corporations Act. Some cases suggest that an interim injunction should not be granted under s 1324(4) unless there is a serious question to be tried as to the applicant's entitlement to final injunctive relief under s 1324(1) and that equitable principles such as the balance of convenience may be relevant to the grant of an interim injunction under this section, at least in an application of a person other than ASIC.\textsuperscript{38} Other cases indicate that, particularly in applications for interlocutory relief by ASIC, the Court's exercise of its statutory jurisdiction under the section is not restricted by discretionary considerations applicable to an injunction in equity, and the Court should have regard to the public interest in curtailing possible wrongdoing, the countervailing expectation of persons that their commercial activities will not be restricted until a matter has been determined at a hearing, whether there has been or is a continuing or proposed contravention of the Corporations Act and whether an interim injunction would serve a purpose under the Corporations Act or would promote ASIC's corporate regulation objectives.\textsuperscript{39}

In \textit{CME Properties (Australia) Pty Ltd v Prime Capital Securities Pty Ltd} [2016] WASC 231, Le Miere J referred to both views and expressed the view (at [13]) that:

“Although traditional equitable principles do not circumscribe the court’s consideration of an application for an interim injunction under the s 1324(4) of the Corporations Act, the court will always examine carefully whether there is a serious question to be tried and where the balance of convenience lies and will not grant an injunction where it would not have done so if it were exercising its traditional equity jurisdiction unless there are matters relating to the statutory obligation sought to be enforced or the public interest which require the grant of the injunction.”


\textsuperscript{39} \textit{Corporate Affairs Commission v Lombard Nash International Pty Ltd} (1986) 11 ACLR 566; 5 ACLC 269; \textit{Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mauer-Swisse Securities Ltd} above; \textit{Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Triton Underwriting Insurance Agency} above at [23].
Section 1324(8) in turn provides that the Court must not require ASIC or another person, as a condition of granting an interim injunction, to give an undertaking as to damages. There is an open question whether the Court can take into account the absence of such an undertaking in determining where the balance of convenience lies.\textsuperscript{40}

**Damages in substitution for an injunction under Lord Cairns Act and under s 1324(10) of the Corporations Act**

The power to order damages in equity in lieu of an injunction has existed since the *Chancery Amendment Act 1858* (UK) (21 & 22 Vict. c. 27) (*Lord Cairns Act*). That power is continued under s 68 of the *Supreme Court Act 1970* (NSW) and is now available where the Court has power to grant an injunction against a breach of covenant, contract or agreement or against the commission or continuance of a wrongful act, or to order specific performance of a covenant, contract or agreement. There is authority that the power of the court to award damages under that section is only available if, at the date of commencement of the proceedings, the court could (not necessarily would) have granted a final injunction or specific performance.\textsuperscript{41}

On its face, s 1324(10) of the *Corporations Act* might appear to have a somewhat similar structure. That subsection provides that, where the court has power under s 1324 to grant an injunction against a person, the court also has power to order that person to pay damages to any other person, either in addition to or in substitution for the grant of an injunction. However, the bulk of the case law indicates that the court may not make an order for damages in respect of past conduct that constituted or may have constituted a contravention of the *Corporations Act*, if there is no prospect of a further contravention and an injunction would not be granted, and also cannot make such an order if an injunction is sought as an artifice to create jurisdiction for a claim for damages.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{40} Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mapstone above.


The relatively narrow scope given to s 1324(10) matters because, as I noted above, the Court’s power to order compensation under ss 1317H is limited to a claim by the relevant company or registered scheme and claims for damages under both ss 1317H and 1317HA of the Corporations Act are only available in respect of contraventions of the sections that are specified as civil penalty or financial civil penalty provisions. On the present reading of s 1324(10), it will rarely allow a claim for damages where those sections are not available, and many contraventions of the Corporations Act will not give rise to liability in damages.

Third party liability in equity and under the Corporations Act

Under the well-known first and second limbs in *Barnes v Addy* (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 at 251-252; (1874) 43 LJ Ch 513, a person may be held liable for knowing receipt of trust property or for knowing assistance in a breach of fiduciary duty, where that breach can be characterised as amounting to a “dishonest and fraudulent design”.

The matters that are required to establish the element of a “dishonest and fraudulent design” in a claim for knowing assistance have been formulated in different terms in recent cases. In *Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd* [2007] HCA 22; (2007) 230 CLR 89, the High Court observed (at [179]) that *Consul Developments Pty Ltd v DPC Estates Pty Ltd* (1975) 132 CLR 373 established a requirement that any breach of trust or breach of fiduciary duty relied on to establish liability for knowing assistance must be dishonest and fraudulent, so that the impugned conduct must involve circumstances attracting a degree of opprobrium beyond an innocent breach of trust or duty (at [183]). On appeal in *Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq)* (No 3) above, the majority (Drummond AJA at [2112]-[2113], [2117], with whom Lee AJA agreed at [1099]) held that liability could be established if the breach of duty was more than trivial and too serious to be excusable on the basis that the fiduciary had acted honestly, reasonably and ought fairly to be excused under provisions such as s 1318 of the Corporations Act.

A different view was taken by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in *Hasler v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd* [2014] NSWCA 266; (2014) 311 ALR 494; 101 ACSR 167, where Leeming and Gleeson JJA indicated their disagreement with the view expressed by the majority in *Bell Group*, so far as it treated *Farah Constructions* as expanding the concept of a dishonest and fraudulent design to include all breaches of duty more serious than a trivial breach and not excusable by statute. Barrett JA did not express a view as to that matter.

In *Hart Security Australia Pty Ltd v Boucousis* [2016] NSWCA 307; (2016) 339 ALR 659, Meagher JA (with whom Bathurst CJ and Beazley P agreed)
observed that a claim for accessory liability to a breach of fiduciary duty against a director requires that the appellant show that the director had acted deliberately and with the purpose of preferring his personal interest, such that his doing so was dishonest and involved impropriety. The Court dismissed an accessory liability claim against a firm of solicitors, on the basis that it had not been established that the director’s conduct there involved any dishonesty and a claim for knowing assistance could not be established.

The elements necessary to establish knowing participation in a breach of directors’ duties at general law were also recently considered in BCI Finances Pty Ltd (in liq) v Binetter (No 4) above at [306]ff, where Gleeson J summarised the relevant principles as follows (omitting references to authority):

“a person who assists a fiduciary to breach his fiduciary duties, with knowledge of a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the fiduciary, is liable as though they were the fiduciary ... This includes liability to disgorge the property transferred to them by another person in breach of that person’s fiduciary duty, as well as in personam liability …”

The two limbs of Barnes v Addy are not exhaustive statements of the circumstances in which a third person who participates in a breach of fiduciary duty or breach of trust could be liable as an accessory, and a third party may also be held liable if he or she knowingly procures a breach of trust or breach of fiduciary duty or receives property transferred without authority, without showing a dishonest or fraudulent design.44

Various provisions of the Corporations Act impose liability on a person involved in a contravention of the Corporations Act45 within the meaning of s 79 of the Corporations Act. That concept includes a person who aids, abets or induces a contravention and also a person who is knowingly concerned in or party to a contravention. Knowing concern, for that purpose, requires that a person is an intentional participant in the contravention, and that he or she have knowledge of the essential elements of the contravention which must exist at the time of the alleged contravention, and constructive knowledge is


45 This definition takes effect in conjunction with substantive provisions which make it a contravention for a person to be involved in a contravention of the Corporations Act by another person, for example, ss 181, 182 and 183 (directors’ duties); s 209(2)-(3) (related party transactions); s 254L(2)-(3) (redemption of redeemable preference shares); s 256D(3)-(4) (share capital reductions); s 412(9) as to the provision of an explanatory statement in relation to a compromise with creditors; or which impose civil liability upon a person involved in a contravention, for example s 1041I as to misleading or deceptive conduct in relation to financial products or services.
not sufficient for that propose. In a recent decision in Gore v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2017] FCAFC 13, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia considered what is necessary to establish that a person is knowingly concerned in a contravention of s 727 of the Corporations Act, which prohibits the issue of a disclosure document that was not lodged with ASIC, where disclosure is required under Pt 6D.2 of the Corporations Act. In a joint judgment, Dowsett and Gleeson JJ observed (at [38]) that, in order to establish accessorial liability, the plaintiff must show that the alleged accessory knows the relevant factual matters leading to illegality, and it is not necessary to show that he or she knew of the relevant legal provisions which rendered the conduct unlawful. In a separate judgment, Rares J reached the same result, although the steps in his Honour’s reasoning and that of the majority may differ, and the plurality indicated (at [1]) disagreement with Rares J’s approach.

Conclusion

I have dealt with several disparate matters in this paper, linked by little more than the fact that they involved equity or the Corporations Act and seemed, possibly from an idiosyncratic perspective, to be interesting and of practical importance. It is possible, however, to make several comments by way of conclusion.

There are plainly significant areas of overlap between duties and remedies in equity and under the Corporations Act. The overlap between directors’ equitable and fiduciary duties and their statutory duties is an obvious example, reflected in practice by the fact that few cases for breach of those duties do not invoke both the equitable and the statutory duties, and fewer still (if any) give rise to different results as between the equitable and the statutory claims. There are, however, areas of potential difference, including as to the extent to which the equitable and statutory duties may be narrowed or breach of them ratified by shareholders. I have also discussed the possible overlaps of claims by a company for breach of directors’ duties, by a shareholder in an oppression case which may seek to recover the company’s loss, or in a derivative action brought with leave under ss 236 and 237 of the Corporations Act or granted in the court’s inherent jurisdiction where a company is in insolvency administration.

There is also an overlap between claims for equitable compensation or an account of profits in equity and under ss 1317H and 1317HA of the

---

Corporations Act, although more liberal causation principles may apply in equity, and the statutory provisions are not available for all contraventions of the Corporations Act. We have also seen that there may be a difference in approach to interlocutory injunctions in equity and under s 1324 of the Corporations Act, and the power to order damages under s 1324(10) of the Corporations Act has, rightly or wrongly, been treated as relatively narrow in the case law. I have also touched upon the scope for accessorial liability in equity and under the Corporations Act, and we have seen a continuing focus in the case law on the extent of knowledge that is required for accessorial liability, but also an important recognition in the case law that accessorial liability can arise in equity in several ways, and not only under Barnes v Addy above.